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quite decisively. Such evidence is usually taken to imply that small ¯rms invest at
a rate lower than its perfect capital market rate. In our model, however, it arises
because small ¯rms rely more on copying than big ¯rms do: The marginal product
of capital is equal across ¯rms, but its average product is higher than that because
small ¯rms get a disproportionately high external bene¯t.
The results change if one introduces markets for knowledge that internalize the
externalities. We analyze the case in which pairs of ¯rms can form research consortia
and exclude others from using the knowledge that they generate. This exercise in
the theory of clubs and assignments shows that the market outcome is e±cient. We
lose the theory of inequality when sorting among ¯rms is positive, but retain it when
assignments are negative.
2 Intuition
Let's start with a graphical exposition of the case in which the external bene¯t that
a ¯rm receives depends only on that ¯rm's rank in the population distribution of
capital stocks, k. The Figure 1 illustrates the e®ect that inequality then has on a
¯rm's incentive to invest.
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Figure 1: Inequality and the incentive to invest
The ¯gure displays two hypothetical distributions of k in the population of ¯rms.
Distribution II is more spread out than distribution I. A ¯rm that raises its stock
of capital by one unit from k to k + 1 will experience a gain in rank equalling the
darker rectangle if Distribution II is the relevant one, whereas under Distribution I










Figure 2: The density must be zero at one endpoint or the other
Whether inequality is a stimulus or a deterrent to investment and growth depends
on whether we are in the rent-grabbing case in which rank raises access, or in the free
riding case in which rank reduces access to usable knowledge of others. In the rent-
grabbing case, leadership is a blessing, the prospect of a gain in rank is a stimulus to
investment, and the incentive is higher under Distribution I. In other words, under
rent-grabbing, inequality is bad for investment-incentives. On the other hand, if free-
riding dominates, leadership is a curse, the prospect of a gain in rank is a deterrent
to investment, and the incentive to invest is higher under Distribution II. In other
words, under free riding , inequality is good for investment-incentives.
Figure 2 shows why the distribution of capital must, in general, have at least one
tail in the sense that its density must be zero either at the minimum or maximum
capital-level, or both.
For the free riding case, consider the example of a °ock of birds °ying south.
There is a continuum of birds in the °ock. The leader breaks the wind. The farther
back a bird is, the wider the wind-tunnel it enjoys, and the easier it °ies. If it °ew
faster, the bird would gain rank, and this would be bad. But the leader, bird K;
wouldn't gain rank if it °ew faster. For birds K and K ¡ " to °y at the same speed,
the density must be zero at K. For if, instead, it were strictly positive (as, say, the
shaded density is), the marginal payo® to e®ort would jump up at K. Bird K would
then pull away from bird K ¡ " because it would face no disincentive from a gain in
rank. A positive density at K would thus lead to a convexity and a kink in the payo®
that go away only if the density at K is zero.
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